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En este artículo se fundamenta una idea sencilla: 
en la actualidad muchos líderes políticos usan el 
término tolerancia para calificar sus propias ac-
titudes hacia cierto tipo de personas, prácticas y culturas. La pre-
gunta es simple: ¿al estado tolerante se le permite hablar (moral y 
conceptualmente) acerca de la tolerancia? La tesis defendida por 
el autor es que el Estado liberal moderno no puede (por razones 
conceptuales) y no debe (por razones morales) hablar acerca de 
la tolerancia. 
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State tolerance is an offence, not a virtue
In this article the author makes a simple claim: 
in present days, several political leaders use the 
term tolerance to qualify their attitudes towards 
certain kind of people, practices and cultures. The question is 
simple: Is the tolerant state allowed (morally and conceptually) 
to speak about tolerance? The thesis defended by the author is 
that the modern liberal State cannot (because of conceptual 
reasons) and should not (because of moral reasons) talk about 
tolerance. 
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In the past few years, leaders of Liberal States have been using, 
in recurrent circumstances, the term “(in)tolerance” to qualify the 
attitudes they hold towards certain acts, conducts, type of people or 
beliefs. In this vein, the declaration of President Sarkozy towards 
Rumanian gypsies or the attitudes of President Bush towards Arab-
American citizens are examples of intolerant attitudes. Parliament 
leader Geert Wilders refers to himself as an intolerant person towards 
anything of Arab or Muslim origin and Mexican President, Felipe 
Calderon, called the international gay day “the day for tolerance”. 
Many further examples of this reality can be given. As a matter of 
fact, this is also a common idea within specialized literature: as far 
as the relationship between liberalism and tolerance is concerned, 
one of the claims is that the attitude adopted (or that should be 
adopted) by a liberal State is that of a tolerant State. 
Against all this current thought, in this paper I will defend the 
following thesis: 
A liberal State cannot (for conceptual reasons) and should not (for moral 
reasons) be a tolerant State
It is important to not loose sight of the fact that when I speak of 
a «liberal State» and of a «tolerant State» it is because I am moving 
within a public sphere of the discussion, and that by definition the 
public is distinct from the private. If we take this into account, then 
the thesis does not exclude the possibility of there being people, 
individuals, who feel committed to liberal thought or to the philo-
sophy of liberalism and are also tolerant.1 Then, the thesis does not 
rule out the fact that liberalism may be understood in different ways: 
as a policy of the State, as a type of education, as a form of ethics or 
a school of thought.2
We must also bear in mind that I have mentioned two types of 
reasons to justify why I sustain this thesis. The first reason mentio-
1 Although, as we will see in the following section, I will defend the notion that this is only possible if we 
do not adopt a version of monistic liberalism and a universalist conception of morality. 
2 See, “Introduction”, in (Rawls, 1996). Besides John’s Rawls mentioning this possibility, a philosopher 
that has argued this possibility with great forcefulness and at great length is Bruce Ackerman (1980: 154 
and ss.).
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ned is of a moral nature, while the second is conceptual. That is to 
say, according to the second type of reasons, a liberal State cannot be 
tolerant. According to the first type of reasons, a liberal State should 
not be tolerant.
It is also necessary not to loose sight of the fact that the thesis 
I am defending excludes the perfectionist liberal State, such as the 
one proposed and defended by Joseph Raz (1986). The arguments 
that I will present in the following pages only refer to the kind of 
liberal State that refutes moral perfectionism. For this reason it is 
necessary, once again, to delve into the realm of definitions. In what 
follows, it will be presumed that the “liberal State” is one that dis-
plays the following characteristics:
1) The respect for an ample catalogue of freedoms that are not 
subject to a realm of political negotiation;
2) The autonomy of the State regarding doctrines and religious 
norms, as well as particular philosophies;
3) Respect for the true equality of all human beings and for 
non-discrimination, be it direct or indirect, and;
4) Its scope for decision-making is confined to a cluster of rules 
that do not favor any particular conception of the good and 
its construction is governed by formal and procedural crite-
ria of justice. 3
These principals are geared towards affirming that, generally 
speaking, the liberal State emerges from a need to guarantee the 
most extensive catalogue of freedoms, from respect by the State 
within the limits of a democratic public order, and from respect 
for fundamental rights, the autonomy of individuals and their par-
ticular philosophical, religious, ideological and moral convictions. 
It should be pointed out that public order must have the freedom 
to elaborate collective norms within the limits imposed by a pre-
viously established framework of rights, without it being biased by 
some particular conception of the good that dominates over the 
power and the public institutions.
3 We can find these characteristics reflected in the proposals of State liberalism that have been offered by 
liberals such as (Rawls, 1999; 1996), (Nozick, 1974), (Ackerman, 1980). For the Anglo-Saxon front, 
and for Latin-Americans (Garzón Valdés, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c), (Nino, 2005; 1996). 
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4 Garzón Valdés, “«No pongas tus sucias manos sobre Mozart». Algunas consideraciones sobre el concep-
to de tolerancia”, this text has been published in various places, and the one I will be referring to here 
- the same that I have quote in other parts of the thesis- can be found in his book, Instituciones Suicidas 
(2000: 181-98. Specially, p. 182). 
5 Other philosophers, such as Annette Schmitt, Mary Warnock, Peter Nicholson and, Susan Mendus 
sustain the thesis that tolerance is conceptually constructed under the basis of these three circumstan-
ces. See, (Schmitt, 1992: 71-85), (Warnock, 1987: 123-145), (Nicholson, 1985: 158-176), (Mendus, 
1989).
As far as tolerance is concerned, I will understand it as a «dispo-
sitional property» that is «tested in diverse and reiterated circums-
tances» which will be call the «circumstances of tolerance».4 The-
se three specific circumstances refer to: i) the injury of a relevant 
conviction, ii) the capacity or adequate competence to restrain the 
tolerated individual and, iii) the balancing of reasons in favor of 
non-intervention against the tolerated individual.5
For the case at hand, it is important not to loose sight of the first 
and second circumstance of tolerance, that is to say: the injury of a 
relevant conviction and the capacity or competence to stop, detain 
or hinder the tolerated individual. 
The importance of taking into account the first circumstance of 
tolerance is due to the fact that it is because of it that the mecha-
nism of tolerance is activated; if the tolerating subject does not con-
sider that one of his convictions has been injured by a third party, 
then the question as to whether he should or should not tolerate a 
certain act will never raised. 
While the importance of taking into account the second cir-
cumstance of tolerance is due to the fact that, even though it might 
actually injure one of our relevant convictions, not every act com-
mitted by a third party encroaches on the realm of the tolerable. 
And in this case it does not have access, because we cannot do 
anything against that act. For example, it is not possible to tolerate 
a storm or a heat wave, as it is also impossible to tolerate an ear-
thquake. One cannot in principle say that an employee tolerates 
his boss. We say that these things are suffered or endured, but not 
tolerated. This is due to the impossibility of doing anything against 
them. There are the cases in which we cease to be subjects of tole-
rance and instead become victims of patience. 
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Why a Liberal State should not be a Tolerant State
The first argument is directed against the idea that a liberal Sta-
te must be neutral. To sustain the said thesis I will turn to the first 
circumstance of tolerance, namely the injury of a relevant conviction.
Luis Villoro states that: «a conviction corresponds to the beliefs 
we deem to be vitally important, those that satisfy our ends and give 
sense to our existence, those that orient our life’s necessary actions, 
although not necessarily the most probable or proved». (Villoro, 
1982: 119). This means that a conviction plays an important role wi-
thin the system of values or rules that harbor it. Other philosophers 
such as Bernard Williams for example would say that a conviction 
is one of the elements that constitute the ground project of a moral 
agent (Williams, 2005: 13). 
This means that a conviction is a part of my conception of a 
good life, of that life which I consider to be worth living. Personal 
convictions are derived from the key questions that address the no-
tion of a moral life: how is it that I must live? How should I treat 
others? What are my commitments to society, to my fellow mates, 
to my family, to my friends? etc.
According to this view, in the first instance the tolerating sub-
ject will always depart from his initial moral considerations when 
judging an action as being bad or repugnant. That is to say, he de-
parts from the principles and rules that make up his conception of 
the good life. In this case, the tolerant subject considers that a given 
act or thought is wrong from the point of view of his initial moral 
convictions. However, and in spite of this, for particular reasons 
decides to refrain from intervening against it, but rather chooses to 
restrain the normative strength of his conviction for a given period 
of time: that is, he decides to tolerate the act in question. 
From this perspective, a liberal State is related, first and fore-
most, to a practical condition: neutrality. What this means to say is 
that the State cannot interfere with the development of different 
and reasonable conceptions of the good adopted by the individuals. 
Furthermore, if the State actually adopts a liberal stance in all se-
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riousness and sincerity, then it must not favor or privilege any con-
ception of the good.
But this is not the only demand. Another requirement of neu-
trality is that the State cannot act in accordance with a conception 
of the good. That is to say, a Liberal State should not adopt any 
religious, ideological or philosophical stance (Ackerman, 1980: 11-
12). From this perspective, we may see that one of the requisites that 
must be met by the «liberal State» entails the regulation of its acts 
in accordance with a previously accepted framework of rules and 
principles established by certain criteria that ensure its rightness, 
in other words its commitment to justice. For most liberal authors 
these are the types of requirements that limit the performance of 
the State, while at the same time allow the peaceful coexistence of 
a plurality of reasonable conceptions of the good that may be incom-
patible and incommensurable with each other (Rawls, 1996: 133).
Bearing these considerations in mind, we could then say that 
being tolerant implies the absence of the State’s neutral attitude 
in the face of a determined state of things. That is to say, tolerance 
does not entail neutrality.6 Neutrality is comparable to the attitude 
of a referee. What I meant to say with this is that he cannot be bia-
sed in favor of the parties between which he is attempting to arbi-
trate, precisely because he runs the risk of loosing the neutral stance 
that is required of him. The tolerant person has no place in this 
game. The fact that he, for specific reasons, decides to refrain from 
intervening in favor of or against someone or some state of affairs 
does not mean that he has not taken sides or sided with a specific 
moral stance, in the face of that something or some state of affairs.
Let us recall for the case in point, that according to Ernesto 
Garzón, the formal structure of the concept of tolerance is compri-
sed of a triadic relationship represented by a person ‘a’ that tolerates 
(‘T’) an act ‘X’ of another person ‘b’ who is the recipient of ‘T’ in a 
specific circumstance ‘c’. A relationship that Garzón simplifies with 
the formula: 
aTbXc t1…..tn
6 This thesis is also defended by Andrew Jason Cohen in (2004: 75-76). Cohen states: “One can remain 
neutral between two parties by failing to tolerate either”. 
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In that sense, when an act of tolerance occurs the conflict takes 
place between two actors (or groups of actors) a and b, while in the 
structure of neutrality, there are two actors in conflict - let us once 
again call them ‘a’ and ‘b’. but there is also a third mediator, ‘c’. 
So there is also a structural difference between tolerance and neu-
trality. Aside from this, Let us take into account another relevant 
fact. According to the above, the tolerant subject has the capacity 
to cease being tolerant at any given moment. Following this train 
of thought, if we are saying that the State is an entity that carries 
out acts of tolerance, we are granting it the possibility, at any given 
time, to cease being tolerant. We derive from this a fact which in 
my opinion it is important to underscore: if an act of tolerance is, by 
definition, an omission (namely, to refrain from acting, for specific 
reasons, against the act that injured a relevant conviction) and if 
we accept that, for someone to “omit” the commission of action ‘x’ 
is because, among other things, he was capable of realizing ‘x’, then, 
we must also accept that one who tolerates ‘x’ at some point or ano-
ther also had the capacity to not-tolerate ‘x’. (Rivera López, 1997: 
153-154). That is to say, one can only be tolerant if one has the 
capacity not to be tolerant (González de la Vega, 2010: 109–126, 
specially, p. 118).
When a liberal State starts considering to (in)tolerate certain 
conducts or plans of life, it is the moment when such a State is 
abandoning the liberal framework to start moving into a sort of au-
thoritarian regime. In Latinamerica we know well enough the con-
sequences that happened when a State regime leaves aside the neu-
trality that is imposed over them by the human rights framework. 
From the military assembly in Argentina (which was intolerant 
towards any kind of dissidence) to the Pinochet Regime in Chile. 
Conceptually speaking, if a State wants to be recognized as a liberal 
State, then, it most take seriously the normative force that human 
rights have.   
It is said that a liberal State practices neutrality precisely in or-
der that numerous and varied plans of life may flourish. However, 
let us suppose that the State could, under certain objective criteria, 
determine which life plans are better or fairer and, therefore, begin 
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to act politically in accordance with the framework of those better 
or fairer life plans (exactly, as the kind of State defended by Joseph 
Raz). We could hardly say that such a State is a neutral State; as in 
fact Raz admits by completely refuting the idea of State neutrality. 
Let us recall that Raz not only affirms that the State should not be 
neutral but that the State cannot be neutral (Raz, 1986), (Wojciech, 
1990: 122-133).
However, what would happen if the State I have been imagi-
ning, in spite of its knowledge of which plans of life are good and 
fair, allowed the existence of other less valuable forms of life, accor-
ding to the moral standards it has adopted. Now then, in that case, 
we could qualify that State as a tolerant State (Farrell, 2007: 10), 
as were in fact the actions undertaken by King Henry IV of France, 
who in 1598 signed the “Edict of Nantes” allowing Calvinist Protes-
tants freedom of religion, or the Patent of Toleration issued by the 
Emperor Joseph II in 1781 establishing the civil equality of Catho-
lics and non-Catholics. In fact, this was John Locke’s claim when 
in his Letter Concerning Toleration he asked the English Crown to 
tolerate the French Huguenots (Locke, 1796). However it must be 
borne in mind that the reasons held by these models of State to to-
lerate certain ways of life are of an economic or instrumental nature. 
It should be recalled for the case in point that Cranston argues that 
Locke proposes economic reasons in support of tolerating xenopho-
bia (Cranston, 1987: 101-122, specially, p. 102).
Yet, nowadays what a liberal expects from State neutrality is 
precisely the opposite. What he is advocating is a means of peace-
ful coexistence governed by universal principles that can easily be 
afforded by any rational agent despite his beliefs as to what cons-
titutes a good life. What a liberal is expecting from State action 
is that it be governed by those criteria of Law, because those rules 
and principles have been elaborated by following certain criteria of 
impartiality and universality. And it is because of these “bridging” 
reasons that any person can accept them, no matter what their com-
prehensive conception of the good might be. That is to say, when a 
liberal advocates the impartiality and universality of the norms that 
govern a society (well organized, Rawls would say), what is being 
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offered are reasons that allow us transit from the fact that “one” or 
more members of a society consider that these are the fair principles 
and rules, all the way through to the notion that “all” members can 
consider it to be so. This is, broadly speaking, what Rawls’ original 
position deals with, where impartiality is guaranteed by the «veil of 
ignorance» (Rawls, 1999: 136 and ss.). For the moment, I will leave 
this point until here. In the last part of this article I will address 
some other issues related to State neutrality that will complement 
the argument considered until now. 
Why the Liberal State cannot be a Tolerant State
 The second argument I have in mind is closely related to the 
previous one, although in this case, we are addressing a conceptual 
impossibility. For this reason, I will base it on the second circums-
tance of tolerance, which states that one cannot tolerate that which 
is beyond his power to change, detain, dissuade or hinder.
To begin with my argumentative line of thought, let us consider 
the following examples:
On February 20, 2005, Filip Dewinter, leader of the Flemish extreme 
right-wing political party, “Vlaams Belang”, when passing by a mosque that 
was being built in downtown Antwerp commented to a Times magazine 
reporter, raising his arms and displaying gestures of disgust: «It is just a 
few doors from the church».7 The same reporter says that the extreme right-
wing politician was well known throughout the city for his anti-immigration 
politics. When he walks through Antwerp he is greeted with both racists 
cries from the Africans and Muslim as well as standing ovations from men 
and women of Belgium origin: “Dewinter, you are doing a magnificent job, 
keep going!” The politics of the extreme right-wing party, Vlaams Belang, 
have gained great popularity amongst the Dutch and Belgian population. 
Their politics are based on the independence of Flanders; it is a politics of 
«zero tolerance», and a rejection of non-Christians, non-Europeans and 
multiculturalism.
In September of 2005, the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published a 
series of caricatures that depicted the Islamic prophet Muhammad. Initially 
7 Times Europe, February 21, 2005.
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the matter did not have mayor consequences, but when some Norwegian 
newspapers republished them, conflict broke out. The printing of these cari-
catures unleashed a series of violent protests lead by the Muslim community. 
The caricatures were accused of being cultural insults, islamophobic and 
blasphemous and of having the intention of humiliating the Muslim minority 
that lives in Europe. On the other hand, some sympathizers of the Danish 
cartoonists argued that they had the right to express themselves freely. [The 
Guardian, February 12, 2008]. However, the reasons they argued were not 
convincing enough for the Muslim community. In February of 2008 three 
men of Muslim origin were arrested in Denmark for conspiring to assassina-
te the Danish cartoonist. [The Guardian, February 12, 2008]. 
If the model of the State that the liberals have in mind is a 
type of State that is committed to constructing a public discourse 
based on full respect for human rights and democracy, then when 
we speak of religious convictions in particular and moral convic-
tions in general, the circumstance of tolerance that talks about the 
“power” or the “competence” that we should have in order to tole-
rate something takes on greater relevance. Conceptually speaking, 
tolerance establishes an impassable boundary. This boundary deals 
with the fact that we cannot tolerate something that is beyond our 
reach. There are factual limits; as argued before, we certainly do not 
say that we tolerate an earthquake or a heat wave, simply because 
we cannot do anything against that state of things. However, the 
liberal State also has normative limits, such as for example when 
a conduct, act or belief is explicitly prohibited or permitted by a 
normative system that is considered superior; this is the case for the 
system of human rights.
Both examples previously presented are cases where religious 
convictions are at play. It should be noted that in cases such as this, 
we are facing convictions considered as morally relevant, and that 
when conflicts between this realm of convictions arise, public opi-
nion often tends to quote the word «tolerance». But, nevertheless, 
behind the perspective of the liberal State when addressing those 
types of cases, it will be difficult for someone to try to offer reasons 
why the State should tolerate the adoption of a religious creed that is 
different from that practiced by the majority of people, fundamen-
tally because of the existence of human rights. How can a liberal 
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State speak of tolerance towards heretics, atheists, Muslims, Jews or 
Catholics when it recognizes the –universal– right to adopt any and 
all religious beliefs?
However, these types of conflicts, within the boundaries of a 
liberal State, do not involve acts of tolerance. Rather, it seems to me 
that these types of conflicts are resolved (and should be perceived) 
as conflicts of rights and their effective application. This is to say 
that it is precisely because they recognize these types of rights (hu-
man rights) that facts such as the declarations of Dewinter or the 
publication of religious cartoons can be subject to criticism. (Nino, 
2005: 15). It is clear that the argument is based in this case in parti-
cular on the universal recognition of the freedom of religious belief 
founded upon human rights. 
This argument is directed at the notion that if we accept that 
these types of normative boundaries have already been established 
within the liberal State, then it will be easier to understand why this 
type of State that respects human rights should not be a tolerant 
State. In cases such as that of Filip Dewinter and the Vlaams Belang 
followers, it would be pertinent to take into consideration the words 
of Rodolfo Vázquez when he affirms that:
While the primary sphere of religious beliefs is the private one, free-
dom of religious belief also entails the right to express and attempt to 
expand ones beliefs in the public sphere: “from the construction of 
places of worship and religious education, to processions and door to 
door proselytism”. What is important to understand is that the correct 
outer limit to the exercise of those rights must strictly be placed within 
the civil society and it must not be done with the use of the State 
(Vázquez, 2010: 98-99).
It is true that the types of boundaries I have been discussing are 
clearer when we speak of tolerance within the “public sphere”, but 
that their clarity fades or is lost when we place them within the “pri-
vate sphere”. It is correct to think that one who holds a dogmatic 
religious belief has the certainty of knowing our divine destiny. And 
there is no doubt that for this individual, these types of beliefs have 
an ethical-normative (practical) relevance in his life. Nonetheless, 
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the State must inform him that he is also subject to these types of 
boundaries.
Finally, it should be noted that it is more convenient for the 
liberal State to refrain from speaking to its citizens about tolerance, 
because when the public discourse revolves around the subject of 
rights and subjects such as the morality of abortion, euthanasia or 
gay marriage are addressed, what is asked by those who claim these 
rights is not that the State tolerate the conduct they are practicing; 
rather what they want is to be recognized something that they have 
not yet been recognized, this is their rights.
Is there a way in which the Liberal State can defend 
the value of tolerance?
 According to the above arguments, we can now pose the ques-
tion: how can the liberal State defend the value of tolerance? In my 
opinion, according to the formulation I have provided, the liberal 
State is trapped within its own framework of action. If the liberal 
State actually claims to be true to the principles that govern it, it 
will find it conceptually and morally treacherous to speak of tole-
rance. What I mean with this is that if the liberal State meddles in 
a public discourse about tolerance, the probable losses will be grea-
ter that the possible gains, considered from a conceptual and moral 
perspective. It could be said in opposition to this argument, as John 
Rawls has done in his Political Liberalism, that one of the tasks of the 
State or of public institutions that comprise it is to promote, among 
other civic virtues, the virtue of tolerance.
Rawls, specifically states the following:
Even though political liberalism seeks common ground and is neutral 
in its aim, it is important to emphasize that it may still affirm the supe-
riority of certain forms of moral character and encourage certain moral 
virtues. Thus, justice as fairness includes an account of certain politi-
cal virtues –the virtues of fair social cooperation such as the virtues of 
civility and tolerance, of reasonableness and the sense of fairness. The 
crucial point is that admitting these virtues into a political conception 
does not lead to the perfectionist state of a comprehensive doctrine 
(Rawls, 1999: 194).
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Nonetheless, to affirm that State should promote among its ci-
tizens the practice of tolerant attitudes in the face of beliefs that 
are considered morally disagreeable places the project of the liberal 
State in a risky position. This specifically happens in two ways. The 
first is one of the points I have been arguing thus far: the loss or 
jeopardizing of State neutrality. Certainly, many moral and political 
philosophers, as well as liberal thinkers or liberal critics, doubt that 
the State can remain neutral in the face of a plurality of conceptions 
of the good.8 The critiques of State neutrality have ranged from the 
most radical to some that might seem moderate. Among the most 
radical we could place the arguments of philosophers like Joseph 
Raz, who also comes from the liberal trenches. Let us recall that Raz 
has severely criticized the possibility of State neutrality. Founding 
his critique upon the principle of personal autonomy, which if we 
remember, represents a perfectionist principle this allows and even 
forces the State to eliminate life options that are morally repugnant 
(Raz, 1988: 155-198). Other critics found outside the trenches of 
liberalism, such as the communitarian trenches, have criticized Sta-
te neutrality based upon the notion that when the State remains 
neutral in the face of a social controversy that entails deep moral 
disagreements (such as abortion), it is actually favoring one of the 
perspectives being presented. 
This implies that State neutrality is not as neutral as liberal’s 
claim it is when confronted with situations of deep moral disagree-
ments (Sandel, 1989: 521-38, specifically p. 531). To escape these 
types of critiques, liberal thinkers, such as John Rawls, have esta-
blished an entire conceptual defense of neutrality. In the specific 
case of J. Rawls, he distinguishes between two ways of viewing State 
neutrality: i) a neutrality that he calls «procedural» neutrality and 
ii) another that he calls neutrality of «aim» (Rawls, 1996: 191-194). 
The first type of neutrality is understood as the justification of a 
procedure without appealing to any sort of moral values. This is 
the case for the authors who justify the decision-making procedures 
8 What I am thinking of when I say this is argued, for example, by Joseph Raz and Ronald Dworkin for the 
liberal front, and Michael J. Sandel and Alasdair MacIntyre, for the communitarian front. (Raz, 1986), 
(Dworkin, 1989: 479-504), (Sandel, 1992), (MacIntyre, 1983).
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through neutral values such as impartiality and consistency. The se-
cond type can be understood, according to Rawls, in three different 
ways: 1) the State must guarantee its citizens equal opportunities to 
promote any conception of the good that has been freely affirmed 
by them; 2) the State must refrain from any activity that favors or 
promotes any particular comprehensive doctrine over another; and 
3) the State must refrain from any activity that increases the like-
lihood of individuals accepting one particular doctrine over others 
(Rawls, 1996: 224-235). Nonetheless, in the case of Rawls’ Justice 
as Fairness, the state it is only neutral in the first two senses, accor-
ding to Rawls himself. The form of the State proposed by his theory 
of justice cannot be neutral in the third sense. This is because it is 
inevitable for the basic structure he proposes to have «considera-
ble influential effects on the selection of the lasting comprehensive 
doctrines that are capable of winning supporters over a period of 
time» (Rawls, 1996: 235)9. 
If we accept the Rawlsian terminology, then the argument that 
has been developed has moved towards procedural neutrality. And 
it is because of this that the argument proposes that the State can-
not be a tolerating subject, and refers to the framework of rights 
and procedural rules of a neutral character that govern it. However, 
it seems that the battle is not lost when we seek to affirm that a 
liberal State is, or can be, a tolerant State because some liberals still 
endorse the alternative proposed by Rawls: this entails accepting 
that the basic structure adopted by public institutions may assist in 
promoting certain values and civic virtues such as tolerance. Ne-
vertheless, the promotion of the value of tolerance (and any other 
of liberalism’s substantive values) on behalf of the State would se-
riously jeopardize the neutral stance adopted by the first and second 
senses mentioned above. If we accept that the State must remain at 
a distance from the substantive decisions made by each of the mem-
bers of the social community and that the State must guarantee all 
people the equal opportunity to develop their own comprehensive 
conceptions of the good, then the promotion of some values would 
9 See, (Rivera, 2005: 135-65, specifically p. 144, footnote 14).
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countermand those other two claims of neutrality. Every citizen’s 
immediate question would be: why does the State promote such va-
lues (tolerance) and not other values such as solidarity or communal 
union or traditional families? The response that a liberal might offer 
to this question is that the value of tolerance is precisely the one 
that affords each and every person the opportunity to adopt the life 
plan that best suits their interests and personal desires. In this way, 
it is seen as a value that protects and promotes the development of 
personal autonomy. 
However, if this is the answer, then the liberal State is once 
again in a bind. If the liberal State believes that it must promote 
tolerance among its citizens, it would then seem that it is willing to 
promote liberalism’s values –although maybe not through the same 
sanctioning measures as those proposed by Joseph Raz (1988: 415). 
In that case, liberalism would leave behind its claim to be a non-
metaphysical but rather a political doctrine and would start to move 
into the realm of liberal republicanism. As is known, republicanism 
sustains that the State has the obligation to promote certain civic 
virtues such as tolerance and solidarity (but without falling into per-
fectionist measures), so that it may be possible to construct liberal 
public institutions, such as democracy and the respect of rights.10 
The displacement that might be suffered if the liberal State cho-
oses to promote the value of tolerance coincides with the criticism 
brought by Bernard Williams according to which, if tolerance is ba-
sed upon the value of personal autonomy, then promoting tolerance 
means likewise, promoting a substantive principle that belongs to a 
particular conception of the good (Williams, 2005: 128, specially, 
p. 31). This is to say, the State has ceased to be neutral and has 
begun to promote a given morality, in this case the liberal morality. 
If so, then the State could begin to tolerate certain ways of life that 
do not match the moral ideals of liberalism but which respect the 
principle of harm. In my opinion this movement makes sense when 
it amalgamates with the idea that several liberals, as heirs to Rawls, 
10 This is one of the central arguments used by Félix Ovejero in his book Incluso un pueblo de demonios: 
democracia, liberalismo, republicanismo (2008), in order to defend the deliberative democracy that repu-
blicanism claims.
Revista Co-herencia  Vol. 8,  No 14  Enero - Junio 2011, pp. 113-130. Medellín, Colombia (ISSN 1794-5887)
128
advocate: the thesis of «reasonable pluralism». Let us recall that 
the pluralism of “justice as fairness” carries with it the predicate 
«reasonable» in the sense that it is limited to certain life plans, and 
therefore not all of them are tolerable. 
To sum up, within the realm of a liberal State, tolerance does 
not seem to be a virtue, but rather a vice. It seems that both ele-
ments are incompatible with the framework that regulates the per-
formance of public institutions
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